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Abstract—Debugging denotes the process of detecting root
causes of unexpected observable behaviors in programs, such as
a program crash, an unexpected output value being produced or
an assertion violation. Debugging of program errors is a difficult
task and often takes a significant amount of time in the software
development life cycle. In the context of embedded software, the
probability of bugs is quite high. Due to requirements of low code
size and less resource consumption, embedded softwares typically
do away with a lot of sanity checks during development time. This
leads to high chance of errors being uncovered in the production
code at run time. In this paper we propose a methodology for
debugging errors in BusyBox, a de-facto standard for Linux in
embedded systems. Our methodology works on top of Valgrind,
a popular memory error detector and Daikon, an invariant
analyzer. We have experimented with two published errors in
BusyBox and report our findings in this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded software and systems have come to dominate
the way we interact with computer and computation in our
everyday life. Validation and debugging of embedded systems
is therefore invariably, and inextricably an issue of paramount
importance in today’s fast paced development process and
stringent time to market deadlines. As a result the debugging
problem for embedded software systems has aroused signifi-
cant research interest in the academic and industry community.
Today’s programming languages and compiler technologies
have reached a fairly high level of sophistication, thereby
allowing the programmers to design large complex pieces of
code in less time. Embedded software systems are designed
with some additional objectives (e.g. low code size, low
memory foot print etc.) as compared to normal software. In
keeping with these objectives, embedded system softwares are
often designed without sufficient sanity checking aids (e.g.
exceptions, signal handlers, assertions etc.). As a result, the
probability of bugs being uncovered at production time in
embedded software is quite high.
A software bug[4] is an error, flaw, mistake, undocumented
feature that prevents it from behaving as intended (e.g. pro-
ducing an incorrect result). Most bugs arise due to mistakes
and errors made by the programmer, either in the program
source code or its design, and a few are caused by compilers
producing incorrect code. It is worthwhile to note that mani-
festation of a bug may be very different from the bug itself,
thus the main task in debugging is to trace back the bug source
from the manifestation of it. A good bug report should be able
to take in a manifestation of a bug and locate the root cause.
In this paper, we propose a methodology for debugging
memory usage errors in embedded software. Our method
involves performing memory checking and invariant analysis
on the program under test. Given the observable errors, we
perform memory checking using Valgrind[3], and deduce a
set of causes of the observed memory error. This is followed
by an invariant analysis using Daikon[2], one of the oldest and
most widely used invariant detectors. Given a buggy program
and a test input that demonstrates the bug, we symbolically
extract the set of invariants from the buggy program and a
stable program (not having the bug) for the same specification
and compare the invariants thus found. The result of this
comparison is analyzed with respect to the bug manifestation
and points to a set of possible causes of the bug.
We employ our method on BusyBox[1], the de-facto standard
for Linux in embedded devices. It provides many of the
standard utilities but has a smaller code size. Researchers have
analyzed BusyBox and reported 21 bugs in BusyBox [8]. Our
objective in this paper is to locate the root causes of some
of these bugs using memory checking and invariant analysis.
In particular, we work with two of the 21 bugs, namely, arp
and top, both of which result in segmentation violation on
execution in BusyBox version 1.4.2.
Our methodology for root cause analysis works in two steps.
Firstly, we perform memory checking using Valgrind on the
buggy version of BusyBox. Valgrind directly reports memory
errors, pointing to the lines of source where memory access is
faulty. Secondly we choose two versions of BusyBox, namely,
the buggy one and another one which does not demonstrate
the bug and perform invariant extraction using Daikon. A
comparison of the invariants thus produced lead us to the
behavioral anomaly between the two program versions.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents related
work. Section III presents an overview of BusyBox. Section
IV presents experiments done using Valgrind, while Section
V describes our experimentation done with Daikon.
II. RELATED WORK
In a recent publication, Jeff H. Perkins[6] et. al has proposed a
system that automatically patches errors in deployed softwares.
In this approach, Clearview[6] is used to correct unknown
errors in the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) softwares. As
per its architecture, learning, monitoring, correlated invariant
identification, candidate repair generation and candidate re-
pair evolution phases perform invariant analysis and mem-
ory checking rigorously. Daikon[3] is used in its learning
component to analyze the various invariants present in the
code. HeapGuard and Determina Memory Firewall[5] help in
monitoring phase incorporating the monitor to detect a failure
and the failure location.
The work [7] illustrates invariant analysis by Daikon while
performing mutation test. Mutation test basically measures
the adequacy of a test suite by introducing artificial defects
(mutations) into a test program. The assessment of the muta-
tions are done by dynamic invariants. Different versions (with
invariant checkers) originating from a given source program,
are checked by JAVALANCE (relies on invariant detection
engine of DAIKON) to find the best survived mutation.
One of the first efforts for debugging program changes is [9].
This paper identifies the changes across program versions and
searches among subsets of this change set to identify which
changes could be responsible for the given observable error.
In evolving program debugging, a buggy program version is
simultaneously analyzed with older stable program version.
Recently a paper proposed the DARWIN approach [10] for
debugging program versions. DARWIN performs dynamic
symbolic execution along the execution of a given test input in
two programs. DARWIN method is basically suited for debug-
ging branch errors (or code missing errors where the missing
code contains branches). Dynamic slicing [11] has so far been
studied as an aid for program debugging and understanding. A
recent work[12] uses dynamic program dependencies to seek
the involved parts of an input that are responsible for a given
failed output. Research such as [13],[14] combine symbolic
execution and dependency analysis for test suite augmentation.
[15] focuses on debugging a given failing test case based upon
golden implementation driven software debugging. There are
various published methodologies that search for failing tests
(that demonstrate an observable error), such as – the DSD-
crasher which combines static and dynamic analysis[16], and
bug finding methodology approaches relying upon software
model checking (e.g.,[17]). Symbolic execution has also been
used for generating problematic or failing tests. The work on
Directed Automated Random Testing (DART) [18] combines
symbolic and concrete execution to explore different paths of a
program. A recent work [8] uses symbolic execution on GNU
Coreutilities as well as BusyBox to compute test-suites with
high path coverage.
Our work proposes an experimental framework for analyzing
some published bugs in BusyBox. We employ Valgrind and
Daikon in an attempt to locate the root causes of two memory
bugs in BusyBox utilities.
III. BUSYBOX
BusyBox is a fairly comprehensive set of programs needed
to run a Linux system. Moreover it is the de-facto standard
for Embedded Linux systems, providing many standard Linux
utilities, but having small code size (size of executables),
than the GNU Core Utilities. BusyBox provides compact
replacements for many traditional full-blown utilities found
on most desktop and embedded Linux distributions. Examples
include the file utilities such as ls, cat, cp, dir, head, and tail.
BusyBox also provides support for more complex operations,
such as ifconfig, netstat, route, and other network utilities.
BusyBox is remarkably easy to configure, compile, and use,
and it has the potential to significantly reduce the overall
system resources required to support a wide collection of
common Linux utilities. BusyBox in general case can be built
on any architecture supported by gcc.
BusyBox is modular and highly configurable, and can be
tailored to suit particular requirements. The package includes a
configuration utility similar to that used to configure the Linux
kernel. The commands in BusyBox are generally simpler
implementations than their full-blown counterparts. In some
cases, only a subset of the usual command line options
is supported. In practice, however, the BusyBox subset of
command functionality is more than sufficient for most general
embedded requirements.
The BusyBox bundle functions as a single executable where
the different utilities are actually passed on at the command
line for separate invocation. It is not possible to build the
individual utilities separately and run them stand alone. For ex-
ample, for running the arp utility, we need to invoke BusyBox
as busybox arp -Ainet and record the execution trace.
Since we work on the binary level, the buggy implementation
for us is the BusyBox binary, which has a large code base
(about 121000 lines of code).
A. Bugs in BusyBox
KLEE [8] has reported some bugs in BusyBox 1.10.2. by a
test generation method. This paper checked all 279 BusyBox
tools in series to demonstrate its applicability to bug finding.
It has been seen that 21 bugs are present in BusyBox. We
tried them on BusyBox version 1.4.2 and found 6 of them
still persist namely, arp -Ainet, tr [, top d, printf %Lu, ls -co,
install -m.
Our objective in this paper is to locate the root causes of some
of these bugs using memory checking and invariant analysis.
In particular, we work with two of the 6 bugs, namely, arp
and top, both of which result in segmentation violation on
execution in BusyBox 1.4.2. To do so, we created a debug
build of BusyBox using appropriate compiler options so that
debugging symbols are present in the binary. We explain our
findings in the next two sections.
IV. EXPERIMENTS WITH VALGRIND
The Valgrind tool suite provides a number of debugging and
profiling tools that helps programmers identify memory errors
in programs. Valgrind is an instrumentation framework for
building dynamic analysis tools. It can detect many memory-
related errors that are common in C and C++ programs and
that can lead to crashes and unpredictable behavior. Valgrind
is an instrumentation framework for building dynamic analysis
tools. Valgrind architecture is modular, so new tools can be
created easily and without disturbing the existing structure.
Valgrind comes with a set of tools each of which performs
some kind of debugging, profiling, or similar task that helps
to improve programs. Some of them are as below.
• The default tool that comes along with Valgrind, is
Memcheck, a memory error detector.
• Cachegrind – a cache and branch-prediction profiler.
• Massif – a heap profiler.
• Helgrind – a thread error detector.
• Memory leak detector.
• Conditional jump or uninitialized value dependent move
detector.
• Invalid Read / Write Detector.
Valgrind is designed to be as non-intrusive as possible. It
works directly with existing executables. We invoke Valgrind
as valgrind –options executable program in command line.
The most important option is –tool which dictates which
Valgrind tool to run. Regardless of which tool is in use,
Valgrind takes control of the program before it starts. Debug-
ging information is read from the executable and associated
libraries, so that error messages and other outputs can be
phrased in terms of source code locations, when appropriate.
Program is then run on a synthetic CPU provided by the
Valgrind core. As new code is executed, the core hands the
code to the selected tool. The tool adds its own instrumentation
code to this and hands the result back to the core, which
coordinates the continued execution of this instrumented code.
A. Locating the arp bug in BusyBox
The arp utility manages the kernel’s network neighbor cache.
It can add or delete entries to the cache, or display the
cache’s current content. There is a bug in the BusyBox arp
implementation: running arp with the command-line option
-Ainet results in a segmentation fault.
To isolate the root cause of this error, we ran the arp utility
of BusyBox through Valgrind using the argument -Ainet. This
results in segmentation fault when run in BusyBox version
1.4.2, on valgrind. Figure 1 shows the test results.
Figure 2 shows a fragment of the source code of arp in
BusyBox. With the command-line argument -Ainet, line 454
sets the ARP_OPT_A mask in the variable option_mask32.
==1571== Use of uninitialized value of size 8
==1571== at 0x4A06794: strcmp (mc_replace_strmem.c:341)
==1571== by 0x44D7BD: get_hwtype (interface.c:936)
==1571== by 0x444B77: arp_main (arp.c:463)
==1571== by 0x407C08: run_applet_by_name (applets.c:489)
==1571== by 0x407DDC: busybox_main (busybox.c:143)
==1571== by 0x407AB7: run_applet_by_name (applets.c:480)
==1571== by 0x407E56: main (busybox.c:72)
==1571==
==1571== Invalid read of size 1
==1571== at 0x4A06794: strcmp (mc_replace_strmem.c:341)
==1571== by 0x44D7BD: get_hwtype (interface.c:936)
==1571== by 0x444B77: arp_main (arp.c:463)
==1571== by 0x407C08: run_applet_by_name (applets.c:489)
==1571== by 0x407DDC: busybox_main (busybox.c:143)
Fig. 1. BusyBox Arp run with valgrind
930 const struct hwtype *get_hwtype (const char *name)
931 {
932 const struct hwtype * const *hwp;
933 hwp = hwtypes;
934 while (*hwp != NULL)
935 {
936 if (!strcmp((*hwp)->name, name))
937 return (*hwp);
938 hwp++;
939 }
940 return NULL;
941 }
444 int arp_main(int argc, char **argv)
445 {
446 char *hw_type;
447 char *protocol;
448
449 /* Initialize variables... */
450 ap = get_aftype(DFLT_AF);
451 if (!ap)
452 bb_error_msg_and_die("%s: %s not
supported", DFLT_AF, "address family");
453
454 getopt32(argc, argv, "A:p:H:t:i:adnDsv",
&protocol, &protocol,
455 &hw_type, &hw_type, &device);
456 argv += optind;
457 if (option_mask32 & ARP_OPT_A || option_
mask32 & ARP_OPT_p) {
458 ap = get_aftype(protocol);
459 if (ap == NULL)
460 bb_error_msg_and_die("%s: unknown
%s",protocol, "address family");
461 }
462 if (option_mask32 & ARP_OPT_A || option_
mask32 & ARP_OPT_p) {
463 hw = get_hwtype(hw_type);
464 if (hw == NULL)
465 bb_error_msg_and_die("%s: unknown
%s",
hw_type, "hardware type");
466 hw_set = 1;
467 }
468 //if (option_mask32 & ARP_OPT_i)... -i
469
470 if (ap->af != AF_INET) {
471 bb_error_msg_and_die("%s: kernel only
supports ’inet’", ap->name );
472 }
473
474 /* If no hw type specified get default */
475 if (!hw) {
476 hw = get_hwtype(DFLT_HW);
477 if (!hw)
478 bb_error_msg_and_die("%s: %s not
supported",DFLT_HW, "hardware type");
479 }
....
}
Fig. 2. BusyBox arp application
==1575== Invalid read of size 1
==1575== at 0x43310E: xstrtou_range_sfx (
xatonum_template.c:27)
==1575== by 0x463605: top_main (top.c:431)
==1575== by 0x407C08: run_applet_by_name
(applets.c:489)
==1575== by 0x407DDC: busybox_main
(busybox.c:143)
==1575== by 0x407AB7: run_applet_by_name
(applets.c:480)
==1575== by 0x407E56: main (busybox.c:72)
==1575== Address 0x0 is not stack’d, malloc’d
or (recently) free’d
==1575== Process terminating with default action
of signal 11 (SIGSEGV)
==1575== Access not within mapped region at
address 0x0
==1575== at 0x43310E: xstrtou_range_sfx
(xatonum_template.c:27)
==1575== by 0x463605: top_main (top.c:431)
==1575== by 0x407C08: run_applet_by_name
(applets.c:489)
==1575== by 0x407DDC: busybox_main
(busybox.c:143)
==1575== by 0x407AB7: run_applet_by_name
(applets.c:480)
==1575== by 0x407E56: main (busybox.c:72)
Fig. 3. BusyBox top run with valgrind
Because no H or t option was given in the command line,
hw_type was set to NULL. The bug is at line 462: instead
of checking the mask of hardware type, the program checks
for the mask of address family, ARP_OPT_A, which led to line
463, which passed the NULL hw_type into get_hwtype
function, and caused a segmentation fault at line 936 due to a
NULL argument in the string comparison function strcmp.
B. Locating the top bug in BusyBox
The top program provides a dynamic real-time view of a
running system. It can display system summary information
as well as a list of tasks currently being managed by the Linux
kernel. The types of system summary information shown and
the types, order and size of information displayed for tasks
are all user configurable and that configuration can be made
persistent across restarts.
Top which is run with option d is buggy in busybox v1.4.2.
If we run BusyBox top with option d, it will crash and
a segmentation fault is reported. Option d in top must be
followed by argument which specifies the length of the refresh
delay in the process statistic (in seconds). The top utility
should behave similarly when invoked with -d or d. The -
is complementary in this command. In the normal execution
of top on GNU, both top d and top -d wait for the parameter
for refresh delay. However, BusyBox top behaves differently.
Figure 3 shows the top results.
Figure 4 shows a fragment of the source code of top in
BusyBox. With the command-line argument d, there is a crash
in line 431 as reported by Valgrind. BusyBox’s top uses a
native getopt32 and checks for ’-’ which should have been
ignored by top program. Going inside the getopt32 function
in Line 430, we find the code snippet shown in Figure 5.
414 int top_main(int argc, char **argv)
415 {
416 int count, lines, col;
417 unsigned interval = 5;
/* default update rate is 5 seconds */
418 unsigned iterations = UINT_MAX;
/* 2ˆ32 iterations by default :) */
419 char *sinterval, *siterations;
420 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_USE_TERMIOS
421 struct termios new_settings;
422 struct timeval tv;
423 fd_set readfds;
424 unsigned char c;
425 #endif /* FEATURE_USE_TERMIOS */
426
427 /* do normal option parsing */
428 interval = 5;
429 opt_complementary = "-";
430 getopt32(argc, argv, "d:n:b",
&sinterval, &siterations);
431 if (option_mask32 & 0x1)
interval = xatou(sinterval);// -d
432 if (option_mask32 & 0x2)
iterations = xato(siterations); // -n
433 //if (option_mask32 & 0x4) // -b
434
435 /* change to /proc */
436 xchdir("/proc");
437 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_USE_TERMIOS
438 tcgetattr(0, (void *) &initial_settings);
439 memcpy(&new_settings, &initial_settings,
sizeof(struct termios));
440 /* unbuffered input, turn off echo */
441 new_settings.c_lflag &=
˜(ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHONL);
442
443 signal(SIGTERM, sig_catcher);
444 signal(SIGINT, sig_catcher);
445 tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW,
(void *) &new_settings);
446 atexit(reset_term);
447 #endif /* FEATURE_USE_TERMIOS */
448
449 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_TOP_CPU_USAGE_PERCENTAGE
450 sort_function[0] = pcpu_sort;
451 sort_function[1] = mem_sort;
452 sort_function[2] = time_sort;
453 #else
454 sort_function = mem_sort;
455 #endif /* FEATURE_TOP_CPU_USAGE_PERCENTAGE */
456
457 while (1) {
458 procps_status_t *p = NULL;
Fig. 4. BusyBox top application
....
if (spec_flgs & ALL_ARGV_IS_OPTS) {
/* process argv is option, for example "ps" applet */
if (pargv == NULL)
pargv = argv + optind;
while (*pargv) {
// printf ("argv non option: %s\n", *pargv);
c = **pargv;
if (c == ’\0’) {
pargv++;
}
else {
(*pargv)++;
goto loop_arg_is_opt;
}
}
}
....
Fig. 5. BusyBox getopt32
The pargv here is not NULL, thus there are some non-options
to be processed. In our case here, the non-options to be
processed is string ’d’ and the following while-loop treat it
as an option. However as soon as ’d’ is treated as an option, it
is no longer checked whether ’d’ requires an argument. Thus
the argument stored in sinterval in line 431 of top main is
NULL leading to the crash.
V. EXPERIMENTS WITH DAIKON
Daikon is a dynamic invariant detector that reports likely
program invariants. An invariant can be defined as a property
that holds at a certain point or points in a program. Invariants
have a lot of applications. Some example invariants are as
follows: x > y, y = 2*x-1, array arr is sorted.
The underlying approach of dynamic invariant detection is
to run a program and observe the values computed by the
program. From the observed values, a dynamic invariant
detector tries to infer properties that were true over the
observed executions. Daikon interacts with the program, firstly
by obtaining the data trace by running the program under the
control of a front end (also known as an instrumenter or tracer)
that records information about variable values, and finally, by
running the invariant detector over the data trace generated.
This detects invariants in the recorded information generated.
Daikon creates a .inv file that contains the invariants in binary
form.
A. Experimental Findings on arp and top using Daikon
We tried to run Daikon on two versions of BusyBox namely,
1.4.2 and 1.16.0. Our objective is to collect the invariants from
the two versions when run on the same utilities. However, we
were unsuccessful in our attempt due to limitations of Daikon
in processing large trace files.
Our methodology has two main steps:
1) Generate the program trace using using the kvasir util-
ity [2]
2) Analyze the trace file produced above using daikon to
generate the invariants.
The collected traces are significantly large for both the ver-
sions. Table I shows a summary of our findings. During
the trace collection phase, kvasir invokes valgrind internally
and shows similar segmentation fault as obtained by us by
running Valgrind standalone. Having generated the trace files,
we proceed to Step 2 to generate the invariants. Unfortunately,
Daikon is unable to process the large trace files thus generated
and aborts, without reporting any invariants.
The first column of Table I is marked ”Utility” — this
represents the utility whose observable error is being diag-
nosed. Each entry in the second and third columns is a tuple,
where the first entity is from BusyBox 1.4.2 and the second
Utility Trace size (MB) Time for Trace collection (s)
arp 298, 569 99, 194
top 298, 570 92, 184
TABLE I
Experimental Results on BusyBox bugs using Daikon
from BusyBox 1.16.0. Trace Size is the size of the trace in
Megabytes. The time for trace collection is the time required
by kvasir to record the execution run and generate the trace.
However, in all the cases, Daikon ends up with an error on
the trace files thus generated and aborts, without reporting any
invariants. Hence, we are unable to generate the invariants.
However, we tested our methodology on smaller examples and
found diagnostic results. Currently, we are investigating the
cause of the scalability issue of Daikon.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a methodology for debugging errors
in BusyBox, a de-facto standard for Linux in embedded
systems. Our methodology works on top of Valgrind, a popular
memory error detector and Daikon, an invariant analyzer. We
have experimented with two published errors in BusyBox
with Valgrind and found promising results. Currently, we are
investigating the possibility of correlating the published bugs
with the invariant differences after generating the invariants
produced by Daikon.
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